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(Part 6 of 7)
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: RESPONSES TO THE SECULAR
STATE
The larger
goal of Islamic political fundamentalism is to overthrow secular
states and impose theocratic political law. Only under theocratic law
can the dangers of Western science and society effectively be
eliminated. Only under theocratic law can the sovereignty of God be
extended into that realm of existence which is now controlled by the
“ignorant.”
The Iranian
Islamic revolution of 1979 provided a model of how Islamic
fundamentalists could achieve national political dominance. Against
the backdrop of rapid modernization on the one hand and a repressive
state on the other, the masses in Iran, incited to action by Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, a fundamentalist Islamic cleric, revolted against
Prime Minster Bakhtiar. When the military declared neutrality,
Khomeini assumed leadership of the nation, installing a theocratic
government based on his interpretation of Shi’ite jurisprudence.[61]
The manner in which Shi’ite law was imposed into state governance
provides insight into the ongoing struggles between advocates of
strict Islamic political law and advocates of secular rule.
In theory,
Iran has been ruled by a constitutional monarchy for most of the
twentieth century. Constitutionalism, however, was a political
product of Western Europe. Thus when constitutionalism arrived in the
Muslim world in the late nineteenth century, the concept underwent
modifications which made it compatible with the Islamic faith. In
Iran, the result was a constitutional monarchy more in name than in
practice. By the late twentieth century, however, Islamic
fundamentalists throughout the Muslim world, including Khomeini, were
convinced that state constitutions were too accommodating of other
faiths and were thus diluting the purity and power of the Islamic
faith.
Iran’s new
constitution as crafted by Khomeini dealt with this problem by
radically breaking with all other modern constitutions. Entitled “The
Fundamental Law,” it is an ideological and thoroughly Islamic document
based on the “Mandate of the Jurist,” Khomeini’s belief that a
religious jurist has the right to establish the governance of a
nation-state and demand allegiance of other religious jurists. The
constitution defines the purpose of the nation-state in terms of
imposing the worldview of Islam, restricts the civil liberties of
individuals, assigns sovereignty and legislative powers to the One God
as interpreted by clerical jurists, and establishes social order based
on a strict understanding of Shi’ite basic articles of faith.[62]
Islamic
fundamentalist have met with varying political successes in other
nations. As previously mentioned, Saudi Arabia with its Wahhabi
revivalist heritage has long been ruled by a version of sharia
law, while at the same time welcoming Western influence and the
material benefits thus afforded to the ruling royal family. In
addition, Afghanistan, under Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, was
governed by a mixture of sharia law and local tribal customs
which sought to eradicate all Western influence and enforced strict
Islamic law upon Afghan society in an effort to tightly control social
behavior.[63]
Within many
other countries, fundamentalist pressure on government structures has
increased signficantly in the decades following the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War. In Pakistan in 1977 General Zia, a devout Sunni, seized control
of the country and immediately invoked an Islamization program to
establish Islam as the official ideology and identity of Pakistan.
His larger purposes were to legitimize his military dictatorship and
quell calls for democracy. In so doing, he made alliances with Sunni
clerics and fundamentalist groups, including the Jama’at-i-Islami.
Although Zia sought to establish an Islamic constitution in Pakistan,
he was ultimately unable to do so without destabilizing his regime,
and thus settled for an informal common law system based upon Islamic
law. In the 1980s, Pakistan’s government encouraged the military
training of seminarians (“taliban”), who in turn created an Islamic
state in neighboring Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal from
that nation. Today, Pakistan is still a harbor for Islamic
fundamentalists, although the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks on America’s World Trade Center has led President Musharraf to
increasingly crack down on Islamic fundamentalists involved in
terrorism.[64]
In Sudan,
the Muslim Brotherhood has championed the imposition of sharia
law since the country’s independence in 1956. Despite independence,
civil war between Muslims in the North and non-Muslims in the South
raged on into the seventies. Accordingly, political upheavals and
attempted coups kept the issue of sharia law on the back
burner. By the 1970s, Hassan al-Turabi, a local Muslim Brotherhood
leader and high-profile spokesperson for the fundamentalist cause, had
secured a prominent role in Sudanese politics. At the same time, the
long running civil war came to an end, marked by the implementation,
under President Jafar al-Numayri, of the 1973 Sudanese Constitution
which recognized the rights of Islam, Christianity, and traditional
religions, and forbad the usage of religion as a constitutional means
of limiting citizens’ rights. However, ten years later Numayri did an
about-face and began pursuing a policy of Islamization in an effort to
co-opt the growing influence of fundamentalists. The tactic split
fundamentalists in Sudan, with many supporting Numayri, who one year
later, in 1984, proclaimed himself to be the nation’s Imam
(supreme religious leader and authority). Numayri’s hastily
implemented Islamization program had his own version of sharia
penal law as its centerpiece. The hybrid sharia law code soon
became unpopular and led to his downfall in 1985. Since that time,
fundamentalists have continued to play a powerful role in the
government. The Sudanese legal system is a combination of English
common law and Islamic law, with the later being imposed on all
residents of the northern states since 1991.[65]
In other
countries, Islamic fundamentalism has been historically active, but as
of yet unable to achieve significant political gain. Egypt epitomizes
the difficulties that fundamentalists face in their campaign to
implement their radical agenda into government structures. Despite
the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood originated in Egypt over seventy
years ago, only in the past decade have Egyptian fundamentalists
gained enough influence in parliament to raise the issue of sharia
law on the national level.[66]
[62]
Said Amir Arjomand, “Shi’ite Jurisprudence and Constitution Making
in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Fundamentalisms and the
State, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty
and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 88-109. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The Fundamentalist
Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and
the Sudan,” in Fundamentalisms and the State, The
Fundamentalism Project, Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993),
110-123.
[64]
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, Politics,
and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan,” in
Fundamentalisms and the State, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 123-132.
[66]
Abdel Azim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The
Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in
Fundamentalism and the State, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 152-183.
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