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(Part 3 of 7)
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: SOME MAJOR EXPRESSIONS
As has been
noted, Islamic political fundamentalist movements are a
twentieth-century development. Not surprisingly, the majority of
these movements are of the Sunni variety. Of the 175 Islamic
fundamentalist groups (mainly of the political variety) in the Arab
world as identified by Dekmejian from 1970-1995, only 32 were Shiite
fundamentalists (with an additional four having both Sunni and Shiite
followers).[31]
Tracing the
history of all the various Islamic fundamentalist groups is beyond the
purview of this paper. Accordingly, an analysis of a few countries
will serve as evidence of the varied manner in which Islamic political
fundamentalism has clashed with secular Muslim governments, resulting
in mounting tensions, but varying successes, in terms of political
involvement.
The ongoing
legacy of The Muslim Brotherhood is evidenced in Egypt’s central role
in Sunni fundamentalism: 40 of the 175 identified Islamic
fundamentalist groups are based in Egypt. Of those 40, three are
major fundamentalist groups: Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic
Liberation Party), Jama’at al-Muslimin (The Society of Muslims; also
known as al-Takfir wal-Hijrah) and Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad
Organization). One figure, Sayyid Qutb, is the dominant link between
the Brotherhood and all three of these Egyptian-based militant
groups. In addition, Qutb links the Brotherhood and Pakistan’s
Jama’at-i Islami (the two earliest expressions of Islamic political
fundamentalism) and is the key to understanding modern expressions of
Sunni fundamentalism which originated after his death.
Qutb, an
Egyptian government official who was offended by the racism and the
openness between sexes he witnessed during a visit to the United
States in the late 1940s, became an ideologue and activist, influenced
by the radical teachings of Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, founder of the
Jama’at i-Islami. Joining the Muslim Brotherhood in 1952, Qutb led
the Brotherhood’s shift from non-violence to violence. His influence
led to the attempted assassination of Nasser in 1954, which in turn
led to government suppression of the Brotherhood, including the
internment of Qutb and other radical Brotherhood members. Influencing
the Brotherhood movement from jail, Qutb garnered support from the
military wing of the Brotherhood within and outside of Egypt, while
continuing his opposition to Nasser’s regime.
By the
1960s, Qutb had formulated a structured, albeit not fully developed,
ideology of modern society as evil and ignorant of Islam’s divine
guidance. The duty of true Muslims was to purify the world by the
internal transformation of Islamic society and militant jihad against
the non-Islamic world. He published his views in Milestones in
1964. Qutb, echoing Mawdudi, called for a “vanguard” of dedicated
Muslims to emulate the Prophet in separating themselves from society
in order to achieve the ultimate goal of establishing God’s
sovereignty throughout the earth. The book, along with Qutb’s
martyrdom in 1966, spurred Islamic fundamentalists to rapid growth and
splintering in the 1970s.[32]
The three
main Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist groups are all influenced by Qutb
and draw support from the midde and lower-middle class (bazaar
merchants, clerics, teaches, professionals and burecrats), yet each is
distinctive enough to prevent a unified front. Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami
(or ILP) has focused its attacks primarily on government structures,
while al-Takfir has charged that all who are not part of the group are
unbelievers. Both outsiders, the ILP initially sought to quickly
capture political control of Egypt, whereas al-Takfir pursued a
long-term policy of political takeover. Both groups were suppressed
by the Egyptian government in the late 1970s, although they have not
been driven out of existence. Al-Jihad, in contrast, quietly
infiltrated military, security services and other governmental
institutions. Their power was revealed in the assassination of Anwar
Sadat in October, 1981. The group’s leaders cited the disparity
between Egypt’s laws and Islamic Law, Sadat’s peace with Israel, and
government persecution against Islamists in September 1981 (part of an
effort to counter the growing fundamentalist presence in Egypt) as the
rationale for killing Sadat. In the months that followed, the
government arrested thousands of Islamic fundamentalists, thus
curtailing the group’s effectiveness. Today, the Egyptian government
continues to suppress militant fundamentalism through government
force.[33]
In Syria,
the Brotherhood’s influence is also drawn from the urban middle to
lower-middle classes, comprised of educated small businessmen,
professionals and clerics, the segment of the population which has
benefited the least from the military and rural oriented Ba’thi party.
In addition, the Brotherhood has produced a number of splinter
groups. Syrian Islamic fundamentalists became more militant in the
1970s, turning to armed jihad by 1976. Numerous attacks on the
government structure took place in ensuing years, leading to
government efforts to suppress the fundamentalist groups. The Syrian
government crushed an uprising of fundamentalists in Hama in 1983,
leading to a period of decline for fundamentalists, who were unable to
win the Sunni population to their cause. Despite ongoing repression,
fundamentalism remains an ongoing threat in Syria.[34]
Algeria has
also witnessed the growth of a strong fundamentalist presence. A
combination of agricultural crisis, unemployment, rampant inflation,
shortages in housing and basic goods, declining revenues from the oil
and gas industry, and growing foreign debt led to social unrest and
class cleavage. Militant fundamentalist demonstrations resulted, and
despite the governments attempt to crack down on fundamentalist
groups, mass rioting, led by fundamentalists, took place in 1988.
After a bloody government reprisal against the rioters, the Algerian
president began a process of democratization. The fundamentalist
Islamic Salvation Front then won major electoral victories in 1990 and
1991, only to have the election results cancelled by the military, and
thousands of fundamentalists sent to prison. In the aftermath, the
movement went underground. Islamic fundamentalism continues to exist
in a variety of sometimes competing movements, and has been
responsible, along with the Algerian government, for a period of
violent civil war in the past decade.[35]
Turkey
provides an example of the influence of Islamic fundamentalism in an
avowed secular state. From the 1950s through the 1970s, Turkey was a
multi-party state, experiencing military coups in 1960 and 1970.
Long-standing political unrest and instability led to a political coup
in 1980, with the military regime giving way to a democratic,
parliamentary government in 1982. In the ensuing years, the military
has remained a powerful force within the parliamentarian structure, as
Turkey has continued a program of modernization and remains on
friendly terms with the West. Although the democratic political
structure and relative freedom within Turkish society has allowed
Islamic fundamentalism to flourish, the government and military have
kept fundamentalist groups in political check. The main
fundamentalist group, Turkish Hezbollah, has been responsible for
hundreds of murders in recent decades. In January 2001, the Turkish
government raided the organization, arresting scores of militants, and
killing the group’s leader, Huseyin Velioglu. The raid, which led to
the discovery of the corpses of hundreds of Hezbollah victims, dealt a
significant setback to the militant group.[36]
Perhaps the
most vivid example of Islamic fundamentalism within recent years is
that of Afghanistan. In 1978, the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in a military coup. Allying with the
Soviet Union, the PDPA began shaping Afghanistan along Marxist lines.
With Islam thus threatened, the mujahideen, a loose alliance of
Afghan nationalists, rebelled and took over many of the rural areas of
the country. In response, the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 in an
effort to shore up the PDPA, a move which swung popular support to the
mujahideen even as millions of Afghans fled to neighboring
Pakistan and Iran. The Pakistan government supported the refugee
mujahideen with arms and military training, as did many other
countries hostile to the Soviet Union, including the United States.
Many Islamic fundamentalist groups were among the mujahideen
factions, including Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden.
When the
Soviet Union finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving the
PDPA in power, the mujahideen did not stop fighting. In 1992
they captured the capital of Kabul and overthrew the PDPA, only to
lapse into infighting among the various factions. In 1996 the
Taliban, having emerged as the strongest faction, seized control of
Kabul. Although initially hailed by both the Afghan populace and the
United States, who had hopes for a return of stability to the country,
the Taliban, allied with bin Laden, soon forced their concept of
Islamic fundamentalism upon Afghanistan. The result was a period of
severe oppression as the Taliban, with their religious police,
punished citizens who engaged in un-Islamic activities such as
television, movies, music, kite-flying and chess. Men were forced to
wear beards of proper length, and women were curtailed from public
life and were severely punished if not properly clothed or accompanied
by a male relative when in public. Punishment of offenders in the
form of death was not uncommon.
The reign
of the Taliban, however, proved short-lived. On September 11, 2001,
Al Qaeda operatives hijacked four U.S. commercial planes, crashing two
of them into the Twin Towers of New York City’s World Trade Center and
one into the U.S. Pentagon. The fourth crashed in rural Pennsylvania
as passengers struggled with the hijackers. The attacks killed nearly
3000 people, and the United States quickly launched a counter-attack,
invading Afghanistan and installing a new government on December 22,
2001.[37]
Lebanon is
another Arab country with a strong opposition fundamentalist
presence. Since the 1970s, both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists
(such as the Islamic Unity Movement, the Islamic Association, and Amal
and Ummat Hizb Allah) have been competing for political supremacy,
fueled by opposition to the West and to Israel, as well as Lebanon’s
religious establishment and government.[38]
Iran
provides the sole example of the political triumph of Shiite
fundamentalism. The Islamic revolution of 1979, led by the
influential Islamic theologian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and fueled
to a significant degree by restless young people, provided a model for
how Islamic fundamentalism could takeover government structures.
Khomeini’s widely disseminated speeches against the Shah and
advocating Islamic law helped pave the way for the revolution. The
new regime immediately banned alcohol, repressed women, and
implemented the death penalty for adultery, all the while voicing open
hatred of the West. By the end of the 1980s, however, revolutionary
fervor was waning as Iranian businessman tired of isolation from the
West. Although Islamic law yet governs Iran, the country has made
various overtures to the West, and the current president of Iran
defeated the conservative religious establishment in the last
election.[39]
Saudi
Arabia provides an example of a country governed by Islamic Law (sharia
law). Long influenced by scriptural fundamentalism of the Wahabbi
tradition, the Saudi government in recent decades has nonetheless
faced opposition from many Muslims from both the right and left of the
political spectrum. In a country in which women are openly repressed
and crimes are dealt with according to a strict interpretation of the
Quran, the Saudi ruling royal family has nonetheless maintained ties
with the Western world for their own economic benefit and that of the
country. Accordingly, many militant fundamentalists (both Shiite and
Sunni), opposed to all Western influences, have long agitated for
stricter application of Islamic law. The ruling family has responded
in recent years by making some concessions to militant
fundamentalists, but the Gulf wars have served to heighten the tension
between the government and militant fundamentalist factions.[40]
Sudan’s
distinction lies in being the first country to be governed by Muslim
Brotherhood Islamic fundamentalism. The Brotherhood pursued a policy
of gradualism in the 1970s, while Sudan struggled with socialism.
The gradualist policy paid off in the next decade, leading to a period
of significant political influence in the 1980s as Brotherhood
leaders, including Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, formerly imprisoned by the
government, were released and given cabinet positions. In 1989 a coup
d’etat led to Turabi emerging as Sudan’s supreme ideologue and de
factor ruler. Shraria law was imposed on the country, and Turabi
began an ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Muslims. A strict
Islamic state, Sudan’s government has been a haven for Islamic
terrorists.[41]
Many other
countries have been dealing with a growing Islamic political
fundamentalist presence since the 1970s.[42]
Two examples in the non-Arab world are Malaysia and Indonesia. Since
the 1980s, Malaysia has become an increasingly Islamic nation as
Muslims have proliferated within a society which is open to a variety
of beliefs. Although Islam is now recognized as the official state
religion, the state itself is secular, and the constitution provides
religious tolerance. Within this political paradigm, the influence of
fundamentalist Muslims, initially finding expression in student
activists during political and social crisis in the 1970s, is growing
in significance.[43]
Indonesia,
on the other hand, has the largest Muslim population of any country,
yet is not an Islamic nation. Islamic fundamentalists, although
increasing in influence somewhat, have been hampered by a wide
diversity of Islamic faith traditions that are a result of
long-standing religious syncretism.[44]
The current
conflicts in the Arab world are magnifying the Islamic fundamentalist
influence throughout the world. As such, a closer examination of
Islamic fundamentalist responses to modern science, western society
and the secular state is in order.
[32]
Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World.” 368-374. Sayyid
Qutb, Milestones (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1990).
Ahmad S. Moussali, Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist
Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey (Lanham, Maryland:
The Scarecrow Press, Inc.), 240-242.
[35]
Ibid., 205-208. Hugh Roberts, “From Radical Mission to Equivocal
Ambition: The Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian Islamism,
1979-1992,” in Accounting for Fundamentalisms, The
Fundamentalism Project, Volume 4, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
428-489.
[36]
Anat Lapidot, “Islamic Activism in Turkey Since the 1980 Military
Takeover,” in Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East,
eds. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (London and Portland,
Oregon: Frank Cass, 1997), 62-74. Kushner, Encyclopedia of
Terrorism, 368-369.
[37]
Kushner, 20-24, 71-74, 246-247, 357-359.
[39]
Hito, 142-226. Nikki R. Keddie and Farrah Monian, “Militancy and
Religion in Contemporary Iran,” in Fundamentalisms and the
State, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty
and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1993), 511-538.
[40]
Ibid., 130-151. Hito, 108-141.
[42]
Maddy-Weitzman and Inbar, Religious Radicalism. Pipes,
In the Path of God, 203-278.
[43]
Manning Nash, “Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia,” in
Fundamentalisms Observed, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 1, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 691-715, 724-734.
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