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(Part 2 of 7)
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
“The most
prolific rhetoric of fundamentalism … is reserved for Islam, and
especially for the depiction of contemporary events in the Middle
East.”[9]
It should be
noted up front that many Muslims reject usage of the Western terms
“fundamentalism” and “fundamentalist,” instead preferring the terms
“Islamism” and “Islamists” when speaking of groups advocating Islamic
political law. Both the Western roots of “fundamentalist” terminology
and the extremist perception associated with the term are reason to
resist usage of the term.[10]
Nonetheless, “fundamentalism” is now a commonly-used term in
describing the ultra-conservative expressions of Islamic, Christian,
and Jewish faith groups, among others. This terminology is useful in
that it recognizes, as noted previously, that similarities do exist
among ultra-conservative expressions of various faith groups. In
addition, the term is employed across faith groups by a growing number
of religious scholars worldwide, scholars who note the differences
among faith groups while also recognizing that opposition to modernity
is an instrumental, shared element of certain ultra-conservative
expressions within a variety of faith groups.[11]
Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper, “fundamentalist”
terminology will be employed, although with the understanding that it
is, in some respects, a contested terminology.
Although Islamic fundamentalism is indeed a modern phenomenon, it
cannot be properly understood apart from the larger context of Islamic
faith and Muslim history. Ultimately, Islamic fundamentalism is
religious in nature, and in approaching the subject one must examine
“the dynamics of the expansion of Islam as a world religion of
salvation.”[12]
Fundamentalist Islamic ideology is based upon two “pillars”: the
conviction that Islamic law (the sharia) is the only valid
system for regulating human life (individual, social and political),
and the conviction that a true and faithful Muslim society can only be
achieved through an Islamic state.[13]
The Prophet
Muhammad is the founder and central figure of the Islamic faith. In
610 C. E. Muhammad received his first revelation from God. Over time,
the Prophet received a number of revelations which were transcribed
into the text of the Quran. Received and recorded as God’s direct
revelation (or Word), the Quran became the written text of Islam and
the authoritative source of law. Over the course of ensuing
generations, statements and actions attributed to Muhammad and
transmitted orally by his followers were compiled and written down
into the accepted hadith (many sayings and actions attributed
to Muhammad were disputed). The hadith revealed the sunna
(or path) that Muslims should follow in the daily living of their
lives. Taken together with the Quran and the consensus of learned
scholars within the Muslim community, they eventually formed the
sharia, Islam’s sacred law.
Muhammad developed a small following in his hometown of Mecca, but his
new religious views eventually put him at odds with city leaders.
Forced to flee, Muhammad and his followers settled in the nearby city
of Medina in 622. He soon rose to political and military prominence,
negotiating a treaty with Mecca in 628, then breaking the treaty and
capturing Mecca in 630. For the next two years, Muhammad expanded his
power throughout the region of Arabia.[14]
After
Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E., his followers were left with the task of
trying to determine who should succeed the Prophet (Muhammad had left
no instructions in terms of successors). Initially, the struggle was
of a political nature. Abu Bakr, an early convert to Islam and
trusted advisor and close friend of Muhammad, was selected as the
first caliph (successor to Muhammad). His selection was controversial
and came at a time when the Muslim state was expanding into southern
Syria and Iraq. Tribes throughout Arabia openly revolted against Abu
Bakr, while proclaiming loyalty to Muhammad. Near death, Abu Bakr
appointed Umar b. al-Khattab as his successor. Umar successfully
expanded the Muslim empire, quickly conquering Iraq, Iran, Syria,
Palestine, Armenia and Egypt. The conquered peoples were given the
status of dhimi (“protected peoples”) and were treated well.
Umar utilized local administrators under the rule of Muslim
governors.
Umar’s
assassination in 644 led to the appointment of Uthman b. Affan as the
third caliph. Uthman continued Umar’s expansionist policies in the
midst of growing opposition, at the same time hiring many of his own
kin as administrators, to the point of straining the treasury. In
addition, he took religious authority upon himself, burning all copies
of the Quran other than the one version he deemed the official
version. Uthman was also assassinated, and civil war broke out under
his successor Ali b. Abi Talib. Ali, who had been part of the
opposition to Uthman, refused to punish Uthman’s murderers, in the
process alienating supporters of the first three caliphs. In the
meantime, Syria appointed a rival caliph, Muawiya, who went to war
against Ali and became caliph of the entire empire following Ali’s
murder, thus ending the original reign of caliphs (all four of whom
had been related to Muhammad in some manner) and beginning the reign
of the Umayyad dynasty.
Supporters of Ali were Shiite Muslims, who devoted themselves to
preserving the house of Ali and seeking to amend the wrong done to
him. To the Shiite, the first three caliphs were not legitimate, and
the caliphate ended with Ali, as testified by both the end of
Muhammad’s lineage and the evil acts which took place among the
Umayyad dynasty.
On the
other hand, Sunni Muslims embraced all four caliphs as orthodox,
viewing their collective reign as the golden age of Islam, while also
recognizing that all the descendants of the Arabian Quraysh tribe
(which included the Umayyad clan), despite being marked by some
periods of evil, were nonetheless legitimate caliphs.[15]
Shortly
after Ali’s death, as Arab Muslims sought political organization
following decades of expansion, two rebellious movements, the
puritanical (Sunni) Kharijism and millenarian Shi’ism, arose
advocating Islam as a universal religion of salvation. The Shi’ite
millenarian rebellion of the 680s proclaimed a coming messiah (the
Mahdi), a belief later incorporated into popular Sufism. Kharijism,
on the other hand, rejected the present world by separating itself and
advocating a rigid application of Islamic law as espoused in the Quran,
proclaiming that nominal Muslims were infidels.[16]
The tension
between Sunnis and Shiites has remained to the present time. Although
the Shiites showed the earliest orthodox tendencies, the vast majority
of Muslims today are Sunni, and fundamentalism is more common among
Sunnis than Shiites.[17]
By the end
of the ninth century, Islamic law was in the process of expanding to
include not only the Quran, but also the hadith. Together, the
Quran and the accepted hadith came to comprise the
authoritative Scripture for the faith community. The establishment of
the Sunni Hanbali school of law in the same century, a reaction
against rational theology, provided the medieval archetype of later
Islamic revivalism. The Hanbalites held to the Quran as the literal,
unquestioned, and uncreated Word of God, while affirming the Tradition
(or customs) of Muhammad (Sunna, and hence Sunni) and
the consensus of the Muslim community (jama’a).[18]
The
Hanbalite tradition, in turn, produced the strict Wahhabi tradition in
Arabia in the late eighteenth century. The founder of the Wahhabi
tradition was Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a religious scholar who
formed an alliance with Muhammad bin Saud, the first ruler of what
would become Saudia Arabia, and who traveled throughout the Muslim
world and journeyed to Medina and Mecca. Distraught by the
compromises the Islamic faith had made with popular religious
practices (as expressed in the mystical faith of Sufism), Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab,
seeking to revive the Islamic faith, taught the transcendent unity of
God (tawhid) and strict obedience to the Quran.[19]
The
Wahhabis, believing that modern Islam had become corrupted and
polluted from within, were a revivalist movement which sought to
return Islam to its pure roots. In 1766, Wahhab’s doctrinal views won
recognition among the scholars of Mecca. The Wahhabi movement became
very influential, leading to the founding of other similar movements.
Properly speaking, the Wahhabi movement was a revivalist movement
based on orthodox Islamic law.[20]
Ironically, the Wahhabis ideological opposites (the more liberal Sufi
expression of the Islamic faith, based on popular spirituality)
provided the organizational model for Islamic revivalism.[21]
The Wahhabi movement was one of a number of Islamic revival and reform
movements in the eighteenth century.[22]
In the twentieth century, Wahhabi Islam would provide the theological
foundation for a political fundamentalist state.[23]
The 1857
Sepoy uprising in India, in which both Muslims and Hindus revolted
against British rule, provided the impetus for the next ideological
stepping stone in the history of Islamic fundamentalism. The British
reacted to the uprising by persecuting Muslims. In an attempt to
prevent suspected Muslim disloyalty from getting out of hand, the
British destroyed Muslim holy sites in Delhi. The persecution, in
turn, led Muslim ulama (theologians) to found private
madrasas (colleges) over which the British state would have no
control. The first such school was located in the town of Deobandi,
about 90 miles northeast of Delhi. The Deobandi schools taught
adherence to strict interpretations of Islamic law, based on the Quran
and the hadith. Intellectually, via publications and debates,
the Deobandi scholars sought to establish Islam as the one true
faith. Socially, the Deobandi school of thought rejected the shrine
elements of Islamic mysticism (Sufism) which had developed in the
ninth century as Islam sought to accommodate the faiths of conquered
lands. In the place of mysticism, the Deobandis taught careful
personal adherence to morality and piety as spelled out in the Quran
and hadith. The Deobandi tradition thus served to provide a
highly intellectual, socially structured, and overtly evangelical
scriptural foundation for an Islamic faith which was facing growing
pressure from Western influences.[24]
The shift
from revivalism to fundamentalism initially took place through the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (“The Society of Muslim Brothers”)
movement in the 1930s. Although originally based in Egypt, the
movement has exercised formidable influence throughout the Arab
world. The Muslim Brotherhood, as R. Hrair Dekmejian notes, “more
than any other organization, has been the ideological and
institutional epicenter of fundamentalism in the Arab sphere and the
Islamic world … it is impossible to comprehend contemporary Sunni
Islamism and its Arab manifestations without a firm understanding of
the origins and evolution of the brotherhood.”[25]
Founded in
1929 by Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood tapped into popular
unrest against British rule, local political turmoil, and the
corrupting influence of the West. Banna, a Sufi spiritualist, Islamic
scholar, and activist leader, was the “avatar” of modern Sunni
revivalism. His movement, which was more successful than previous
revivalist movements, possessed an activist ideology, an
organizational structure, charismatic leadership, mass following and a
pragmatic orientation. The movement was based on the Quran and the
hadith, and translated doctrine into social action at a time when
Egypt was in social unrest.[26]
Initially
espousing non-violence, the Brotherhood quickly became one of Egypt’s
most powerful organizations. The group was effectively organized,
made extensive use of propaganda, and appealed to a cross-section of
Egyptian society. However, Banna’s efforts to use politics to enact
Islamic law in Egypt led to state persecution of the group by the late
1940s, which in turn led to the assassination of the Egyptian monarch
by a Muslim Brother, for which Banna was assassinated in reprisal.
The
following decades witnessed escalating clashes between the
increasingly violent Brotherhood (as well as the many new
fundamentalist groups it spawned) and Islamic secular states.
Israel’s victory in the 1967 war was a crucial event. Islamic
fundamentalists proclaimed that the Arab world lost the war because of
a lack of religious faith, and fundamentalist calls for the imposition
of shariah (Islamic) law found even greater reception in the
Arab world. Anwar al-Sadat, who ascended to the Egyptian presidency
in 1970, sought to co-opt the rising fundamentalist tide through the
1971 establishment of Islam as the official religion of the Egyptian
state, and sharia law as a source of legislation (in 1980,
sharia law was made the main source of legislation). Nonetheless,
Sadat’s openness to the West and Israel, as evidenced by the 1979 Camp
David Accord with United States President Carter Israeli Prime
Minister Begin, resulting in peace with Israel, was scorned by the
multiplying Islamic fundamentalist organizations. In September 1981,
realizing that he had underestimated Islamic fundamentalists, Sadat
led the government in taking direct control of all mosques and
arresting thousands of militants. One month later he was dead,
assassinated by members of the Islamic fundamentalist group Tanzim
al-Jihad. Since Sadat’s assassination, a variety of Islamic
fundamentalist movements in Egypt have increasingly turned to violence
against the state, unacceptable social conduct, and even one another.[27]
A parallel
transition from scriptural fundamentalism to political fundamentalism
took place in South Asia via the Jama’at-i Islami (Islamic Party),
founded by the Deobandi-trained Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979)
in 1941. Concerned with the decline of Muslim power in India in the
early twentieth century, Mawdudi determined that diversity, in the
form of interfaith mixing and a growing liberalization of Muslim
faith, had weakened Islam. The answer was to sever social and
political ties with Hindus and other non-Muslims and take up arms
against non-Muslims.
Mawdudi
looked to the Quran for a scriptural rationale for his militant views:
“Fight in the cause of
God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loveth
not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn
them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and
oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the sacred
mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you,
slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith. But if
they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, most Merciful. And fight them on
until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice
and faith in God; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except
to those who practice oppression.” (s. 2:190-193)
Mawdudi also found parallel justification in the
hadith.
The
Jama’at-i Islami was thus formed as a political movement to transform
society via strict Islamic ideology, considering itself as the
“vanguard” of an Islamic revolution. Yet within two decades of its
founding, the party became more pragmatic in approach, advocating a
constitution for Pakistan that included a commitment to democracy and
individual rights. However, faced with Communist encroachments in
Pakistan in the late 1960s, the Jama’at-i Islami eventually abandoned
cooperative efforts and sought to establish a strict Islamic state
identity in opposition to the Bhutto regime. Ultimately failing in
this regard, and losing significant grassroots political support in
the process, the party fell back to trying to accommodate both
ideology and pragmatism. The rebirth of democracy in Pakistan in 1988
has since forced the Jama’at-i Islami to recognize the importance of
further compromise if the party is to have a meaningful voice in the
political structure of Pakistan.[28]
In short, by
the 1980s the legacy of Islamic revivalism, as expressed in Wahabbi
Islam and the Deobandi madrasa tradition, had found firm
fruition in a milieu of political fundamentalist organizations which
were actively seeking to impose sharia law in states throughout
the Arab world and beyond, a subject which will command our later
attention.
The
proliferation of Islamic political fundamentalism, in turn, has been
characterized by certain behavioral characteristics, ranging from
passive to militant. The following characteristics are indicative of
modern Islamic fundamentalism:
Characteristics of Individualistic Passive Fundamentalism
1. Regular mosque attendance (five times a day).
2. Strict Observance of
the Five Pillars of Islam:
a. Profession of
faith (shahadah)
b. Prayers (salat)
c. Fasting (sawm)
d. Almsgiving (sakat)
e. Pilgrimage (hajj)
3. Strict adherence to
Quranic prohibitions (such as abstaining from alcohol and
sexual immorality)
4. Regular religious
meditation, reading of the Quran, and reading of other
Islamic literature.
5. Participation in
religious group activities within and without the mosque.
6. Participation in
neighborhood self-help and mutual assistance societies
7. Growing full beards
(lihya) and thin moustaches as a sign of devotion and
piety.
8. Wearing distinctive
clothing (including a facial and head veil for women)
Characteristics of Individualistic Activist Fundamentalism
1. Pursuit of passive
characteristics listed above with great rigor.
2. Tendency to live
together in specific neighborhoods, sometimes in physical
and social
isolation from passive fundamentalists.
3. Frequenting of
specific mosques that cater to activist agendas.
4. Engagement in acts
of “purifying” violence directed against sinful institutions,
including nightclubs, movie theatres,
and governments.
Manifestations of Collective Islamic Fundamentalism
1. Mosque building
(both private and government sponsored).
2. Radio-television
programming (provides religious instruction).
3. Observance of
holidays (observed with great religious fervor).
4. Mosque attendance
(faithful devotion).
5. The press (increase
in religious instruction in newspapers).
6. Illumination of
mosques (elaborate lighting at nighttime).
7. Religious literature
(an unprecedented increase in printing copies of the Quran
and books on
Islamic history and religion.
8. Displays of copies
of the Quran (in public places).
9. Religious slogans
(increasingly displayed in public places).[29]
Finally,
terrorist activity against Western government and society has become a
vivid expression of Islamic political fundamentalism in recent years.[30]
[9]
Bassam Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists:
Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology,” in
Fundamentalisms and Society, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 2, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 73.
[10]
Gabriel Ben-Dor, “The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism,” in
Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East, eds. Bruce
Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (London and Portland, Oregon:
Frank Cass, 1997), 241.
[11]
In recent decades, scholarly literature on religious
fundamentalisms has mushroomed. Although the purpose of this
paper is neither to survey nor list such literature, the massive
The Fundamentalism Project, referenced throughout this
essay, is indicative of the understanding by scholars of the
appropriateness of fundamentalist terminology.
[13]
Guazzone, Laura, ed., The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role
of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World
(Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Press, 1995), 10.
[14]
Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (New York: Random
House Modern Library, 2002). Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God:
Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1983),
36-37, 72-74.
[15]
Armstrong, Islam. Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman,
eds., Religious Radicalism in the Middle East (Albany, New
York: State University of New York, 1990), 39-47. P.M. Holt, Ann
K.S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis, The Cambridge History of Islam
(United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Fred M. Donner,
The Early Islamic Conquests (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1981).
[16]
Arjomand, 179. Dilip Hiro, Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic
Fundamentalism (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc.,
1989), 2-25.
[17]
John O. Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World,” in
Fundamentalisms Observed, The Fundamentalism Project, Volume
1, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 345-402.
[22]
John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 24-83.
[23]
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islamic Revolution: Fundamentalism in the
Arab World (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,
1995), 130-151.
[24]
Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: 1860-1900
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982),
87-260. Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise
History of India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
99-114.
[27]
Ibid., 77-84. Hiro, 60-107. Gehad Auda, “The ‘Normalization’ of
the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to the Early 1980s,”
in Accounting for Fundamentalisms, The Fundamentalism
Project, Volume 4, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 374-412.
[28]
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution:
The Jama’at i-Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
California: University of California Press, 1994) and Mawdudi
and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996). T. N. Madan, “From Orthodoxy to
Fundamentalism: A Thousand Years of Islam in South Asia,” in
Fundamentalisms Comprehended, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 5, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 288-320.
[30]
Harvey W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Thousand
Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2003).
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